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RECENT BOOKS
THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw. By David Mellinkoff. Little,
Brown and Co. 1963. Pp. xiv, 454. $12.50.
The language of the law should be judged on the basis of its
esthetics or itsv efficiency. David Mellinkoff's recent book, entitled
The Language of the Law, is a massive examination of the failure
of law language by either criterion. Directed against a profession
which is so innately involved in the business of communication,
this is a critical and serious indictment. The charge is supported
by devastating scholarship and thoroughness.
The Language of the Law is partly an historical and encyclopedic etymology of law words, wordings, and cliches, and partly a
running editorial commentary by the author on what is wrong with
legal language. The book is written in numbered sections of separate thoughts with abundant and valuable footnotes (on each page).
However, the author erratically alternates between a dullish, scholastic style and a staccato, jaunty, journalistic style. Consequently,
while the idea of the book is important and interesting, its execution
is often uneven, and at times the book is difficult to read. Nevertheless,
one should enjoy and must respect this book.
In the early chapters, the author views the historical antecedents
of modern American legal language. He begins his analysis of the
history of legal words with Celtic, which was the first dominant
language in England. The next influence was that of the Saxons
and Jutes (450 A.D.), who came from Denmark and Germany and
left a Teutonic influence on the prevailing speech. From then
until the Norman Conquest in 1066, Old English prevailed, and
from this we have taken such words as "manslaughter," "ward,"
"wife," "deed," and "guilty." The Norse and the Old English in
the period from 700 to 1000 were not far apart, and the author
cites a fascinating example of the derivatjon of one phrase from
both sources. "Crook" in Old Norse and "hook" in Old English
meant a bent piece of metal. Later, "crook" came to mean something wrong or dishonest. And, by the 14th century, "by hook or
by crook" meant to steal. 1 Tidbits like this fill the book and will
delight the reader who is curious about the sources of words and
phrases.
With the rising influence of the Church on secular affairs, Latin
became a part of the everyday language in England. The Church
had a great impact upon the administration of justice, and the
clergy composed a large percentage of the literate scriveners and
scholars. Before this, illiteracy was common and most legal transac1. P. 55.
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tions were oral. Latin was the universal language of medieval learning, and its residue is evident, both in legal language still in use
(res ipsa loquitur, habeas corpus, subpoena) and in Latin derivatives (debt, advocate, incorporate). In this regard, the author's explanation of the derivation of "indenture" is delightful. Latin also
combined with existing English and with French, which became
the "language of learning and gentility"2 after the Norman Conquest. French went through periods of rising and falling favor in
England. Although its role was less obvious than that of Latin,
French also played an influential part in molding our law language
(descent, justice, marriage, possession). We still use some French
phrases such as "cy pres" and "fee tail." Middle English in the
period from 1100 to 1500 joined Anglo-Saxon with Latin and
French. This combination gave us such phrases of mixed etymological genealogy as "breaking and entering" (Old English and
French), "peace and quiet" (Latin and Old English), "will and
testament" (Old English and Latin), and "free and clear" (Old
English and French).
The author develops this history through such later developments as the invention of the printing press and the rise of literacy,
written reports, dictionaries, law schools, and eventually he leads the
reader into modem English and modem American law language.3
Here he leaves etymology for criticism and appraisal, and, in so doing,
Mr. Mellinkoff falls victim to some of his own perceptive criticisms of
legal writing-most particularly repetition and redundancy. However, his thesis, "the language of the law should not be different
without a reason," 4 is more than adequately, and often interestingly,
substantiated. Unfortunately, the author spends an inordinate
amount of his time in showing why law language is not more precise, shorter, more intelligible, or more durable than general English.5
The public impression and prestige of the legal profession
suffers as a result of the· language of the law. The average person
comes in contact with special legal language in one of several
typical situations: he encounters a lawyer socially, or deals with
one professionally; he reads a legal document or a law; or, he is in
court in some capacity at a trial. Mr. Mellinkoff says:
"When the juror is told that he must follow the law as
laid down by the judge, and he cannot follow the words-let
alone the law-this frustration does not promote respect.
When the harried businessman is overwhelmed with the lan2. P. 70.
!l. Pp. 240-50.
4. P. 285.
5. Pp. 290-454.
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guage confusions of the government he is taxed to support and
of the professionals he pays to help him, his feelings for the
law and for lawyers are not properly described as respectful.
"Respect for law is no mere matter of words; neither intelligibility nor precision nor ritual will sell bad law indefinitely. But bad language usage can hurt good law; good language usage can promote respect for good law. And for the rest
of this language-conscious century, an important part of the
layman's attitude toward the law will be determined by what
the profession does with its language." 6
The average lawyer talks and writes poorly about the law. As
a result, what is intrinsically the most fascinating and dramatic
profession is too frequently considered a technical, gimmicky,
closed-door society. Legal language can be, and has been, criticized
on two levels. First, its technical execution is poor, primarily because an alarming number of lawyers are not well educated in basic
composition, spelling, and punctuation. This fact was aired recently
when the dean of one major law school publicly criticized the low
level of literateness of law students, and the dean of another famous law school complained about how unsatisfactorily lawyers write
about the law for laymen. The improvement of early education
plays a major part in the solution to this problem. More than any
other profession, the law is particularly suited to a strong grounding in the liberal arts. I remember being surprised when a law
school official advised me that the best college preparation for law
school would be one that stressed English before other general
liberal arts subjects. I am certain now that this advice was correct.
Second, the profession has propagated a mysticism of cant which
not only constitutes a poor choice of language, but also frequently
does not accurately communicate. Mr. Mellinkoff devotes most of
his criticism to this latter fault.
By either public or in-group standards, the language of the law
is wanting. There is a vast potential audience that would like to
know about the significant social issues being dealt with so often,
of late, in our courts and legislatures. The legal profession should
not relinquish to journalism the responsibility for telling this story.
There is too much that journalists cannot know and therefore cannot tell. But few lawyers ·write well enough to do the job (and, in
fairness, it should be added that some who do have an ability to
write do not have the time). Accordingly, journalists have assumed
the task by default. There is a critical need for mature and effective
writing about such subjects as congressional investigations, censorship of movies and obscene "literature," publicity and trials, the
6. P. 453.
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ideological conflicts within the Supreme Court, divorce and adoption laws, and countless other social and political issues of our
time about which lawyers often have special knowledge and experience. Yet, most of what the lay public sees of the law is bilge;
quality work is rare. The proof of the value of good treatment is
that when something of quality is done it is a roaring success.
People love the stuff of the law. I often wonder why the most perceptive and sensitive writer about trials is Sybille Bedford. 7 Possibly it is because lawyers cannot resist personalizing the legal experience. Louis Nizer's deeds are fascinating and of real general
interest; Louis Nizer is not. Perhaps there should be more concentration on training for legal writing. Lawyers could be trained
specially for writing precisely as journalists are trained in the law
by Harvard's Nieman program. Few law schools give any attention
to this type of training in their curricula. The Yale Law School,
however, does offer such a course; the students love it; and its
graduates have published significantly.
Perhaps even worse than legal writing for laymen is the fact
that the case books are full of examples of lawyers' professional
writing failures in their own arenas. Mr. Mellinkoff cites abundantly from these. He shows that some of the words which lawyers
use specially cause their clients problems and that following the
formbook is not the safest route. This latter point was graphically
displayed to me in a law classroom exercise. The instructor had
each of us in my class draft a will. We all borrowed liberally from
the formbooks. A standard formbook clause for wills (and one I have
since seen colleagues use in wills) says something to the effect that
"I direct my executor to pay all my just debts." This little gratuity
is thrown in though few clients ever ask for it. It sounds good
and lawyery. However, a New York court once ruled that this
clause revived a debt which had been barred from collection by
the statute of limitations. Mr. Mellinkoff offers many more striking instances where poor legal language or punctuation has caused
litigation or brought about unwanted results. Legal formalities
also cause trouble, and the author gives examples of archaic uses of
words which are not only vague but wrong and troublesome (aforesaid, forthwith, and/or, said). 8 Lawyers love to duplicate words.
All they usually accomplish is to confound9 when they use such
words as "aid and comfort," "by and with," "cease and desist,"
"had and received," "fit and proper," and the all-time favorite, "give,
7. Her books, THE FACES OF JUSTICE (1961) and AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF JOHN
ADAMS (1958), are the most astute and brilliant perceptions of the trial process
which I have ever read.
8. Pp. !105-20.
9. Pp. !1!10-60.
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bequeath, and devise," which sometimes has appended to it a
"grant" and a few other nuances just to be sure. As Mr. Mellinkoff
points out:
"The drafting lawyer thinks big and fast. He wants to
cover it all, and the quickest way to do it is in the manner it
has most often been done before, in the manner he is most
familiar with. Include! Don't select. Adopt and multiply!
Don't choose between 'inhabitant' and 'resident.' Make it 'inhabitant actually resident.' " 10
Even the advent of written law reports did not bring about the
stability, durability, or precision which might have been expected.
Every lawyer can find a case going the opposite way on the interpretation of "accidental," "proximate," or even "never" or whatever word
is in issue. All the effort of legalese is lost.
The only compensating aspect of the imprecision of legal words
is in the area of developing constitutional law where intended
flexibility is valuable. The words "reasonable," "freedom," "equal
protection," and "due process of law" need constant redefinition
in light of changing times and mores. The story is told that after
Solon wrote the ancient Greek constitution he left the country for
several years so that he would not be called upon to say what he
meant by this word and that. This kind of interpretation is better
left to the Frankfurters and Blacks and to the inspiration of the times.
This does not, however, carry over to statutory language. Mr.
Mellinkoff gives an excellent illustration of the differences between
good and bad language explaining a law. 11
"Penal Code section 384
makes it a misdemeanor for
any person who shall willfully refuse fo immediately
relinquish a telephone party-line when informed that
such line is needed for an
emergency call. . . . Also,
any person who shall secure the use of a telephone
party-line by falsely stating
that such line is needed for
an emergency call shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.''

"State law requires you to
hang up the receiver of a
party line telephone immediately when told the
line is needed for an emergency call. . . . It is unlawful to take over a party line
by stating falsely that the
line is needed for an emergency."

If most statutes are hard for lawyers, let alone the lay public,
to read, the language which is descriptive of legal arrangements is
10. Pp. 363-64.
11. P. 430.
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worse. I have never understood what is and what is not covered by
my Blue Cross insurance contract.
Courtroom talk is also more baffling than it needs to be. The
anecdotes are legion of straight-talking witnesses destroying pompous-sounding trial lawyers by translating legalese into common
sense in uproarious or embarrassing ways. I will always remember
a Kentucky judge telling a jury in one case I tried that he wished
he did not have to give them long-winded technical instructions.
Instead, he said, he would prefer to tell them what Andrew Jackson
told a jury when he was on the bench in Tennessee: "Go out and
do right by these people." This is what juries do most of the time
anyway-when they aren't so confused that they do the wrong
thing for the right (or wrong) reason. As Mr. Mellinkoff states:
"[M]any of these instructions are not designed for the quick understanding of listening laymen, but rather for more or less intelligible
reading by appellate judges." 12 He cites an example:
"During the course of these instructions the term 'burden
of proof' will be used. By 'burden of proof' is meant the duty
resting upon the party having the affirmative of an issue .to
satisfy or convince the jury to a reasonable certainty of the
truth of the contentions of that party. . . .
"By 'preponderance of the evidence' is meant the evidence
which possesses the greater weight or convincing power. It is
not enough that the evidence of the party upon whom the burden of proof rests is of slightly greater weight or convincing
power; it must go further and satisfy or convince the minds of
the jury before the burden of proof is discharged.
"What a letdown! The judge would have done his job
much better telling the jury: 'Jones brought this case to court
and it is his job to satisfy you that Smith hit him.' " 13

So, we can conclude that in style and in function legal language
is in need of improvement. This theme is not new; in fact, much
has already been written about this subject, and Mr. Mellinkoff's
bibliography is an excellent collation of these materials. However,
the theme is worth stressing and repeating, and this book does both
well. In the early part of this century a group of European artists
began a reform movement from which we are all still benefiting.
Such famous men as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius,
Paul Klee, Vasily Kandinsky, and Marcel Breuer began their own
school in Germany, and many of the future's form-givers and tastemakers developed a new form for artistic expression which was
their own. Essentially they showed that meaningless expression
should play no part in art and that art should reflect the mode of
12. P. 434.
13. P. 433.
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its time. Perhaps the legal profession should include in its modem
schooling something of the Bauhaus philosophy.
Ronald L. Goldfarb
Member,New York and
California Bars

